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CASE COMMENTS

FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR. COMMERCIAL SPEECH:
AN OPTICAL ILLUSION?
Friedmanv. Rogers, 99 S.Ct. 887 (1979)
Plaintiff, a commercial optometrist' and member of the Texas Optometry
Board,2 brought suit in federal district court challenging section 5.13(d) of the
Texas Optometry Act,3 which banned the use of trade names4 by optometrists,
but -not by optomologists, as violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.5 Intervening as a party plaintiff, the Texas Senior
Citizens Association asserted that the same section also abridged consumers'
first amendment right to receive information.6 The three-judge district court
1. Optometrists in Texas divide themselves into "commercial" and "professional" optometrists according to business methods. All optometrists, however, are subject to the same
licensing requirements. 99 S. Ct. 887, 892 (1979). Dr. Rogers and his associates operate over
100 optometry offices in Texas. The offices employ the trade name Texas State Optical where
still permitted, under the grandfather clause of the Texas Optometry Act (current version at
Tax. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN.art. 4552-5.13(k) (Vernon 1976)), 99 S.Ct. at 900.
2. The Texas Optometry Board was created by Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-2.01
(Vernon 1976). The Act delegates authority to the Board to grant, renew, suspend, and xevoke
licenses as well as to administer the regulations of the Act. Id. 4552-4.04. The Board has six
members, four of whom must be members of a state organization affiliated with the American
Optometric Association (AQA). Id. at 4552-2.01 to .02. The Texas Optometric Association
(TOA) is the only organization in Texas so affiliated. The AOA's Code of Ethics, to which the
TOA subscribes, disapproves of the business practices of commercial optometry. Therefore,
only two seats on the Board can be held by commercial optometrists. The distribution of
"commercial" and "professional" optometrists on the Board is also challenged by Dr. Rogers.
99 S.Ct. at 892.
3. TEx. Rzv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-1.01 to 6.04 (Vernon 1976). Section 5.13(d) of the
Act provides: "No optometrist shall practice or continue to practice optometry under, or use
in connection with his practice of optometry, any assumed name, corporate name, trade
name, or any name other than the name under which he is licensed to practice optometry in
Texas ......
4. A trade name is a title employed by a business to represent itself to the public. In
contrast, a trademark is the name attached to a certain product that is distributed by a
business. Robinson, Tradenames and Trademarks-State and Federal: Some Random Observations, 22 LA. B.J. 1979 (1974).
5. The defendants in the suit were the other five members of the Board. The TOA intervened, as a defendant adopting the same position taken by the original defendants. 99 S.Ct.
at 892.
6. This plaintiff also challenged three other provisions of the Act. The district court
upheld the plaintiff's claim that Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-5.09(a) (Vernon 1976),
prohibiting price advertising by optometrists violated the first amendment protection of
commercial speech. Rogers v. Friedman, 438 F. Supp. 428, 429 (E.D. Tex. 1977). Defendants
did not challenge this portion of the decision. The second challenge was to TEx. Rav. Cnr.
STAT. ANN. art. 4552-5.15(e) (Vernon 1976), which placed limitations on the ability of optometrists to recommend opticians. 438 F. Supp. at 431. Both the first amendment and the
equal protection claims against this provision were dismissed, id. at 431-32, and the plaintiffs
did not appeal. Third, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-2.02 (Vernon 1976), regulating
the composition of the Board, was challenged as violative of equal protection, due process,
and the first amendment. 438 F. Supp. at 432. The district court held that since the legislature
acted rationally in its decision on the composition of the Board, there was no violation of
equal protection. Id. at 433. The due process and first amendment claims were also found to
be without merit. Id. at 433-34.
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determined that the state's interest in a blanket suppression of trade names was
outweighed by the first amendment rights of advertisers and consumers, and
ruled that section 5.13(d) unconstitutionally restricted commercial speech' On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, optometrical
trade names deserve no first amendment protection because they enhance the
opportunity for deception and are an inferior means of communicating information.8
Purely commercial speech, or speech which does "no more than propose a
purely commercial transaction," was originally excluded 10 from the protection
of the first amendment. 1" In the initial cases involving mercantile expression
7. 438 F. Supp. at 431.
8. 99 S. Ct. at 897. The Court also affirmed the district court's holding that Tax. R .
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-2.02 (Vernon 1976) did not deny optometrists equal protection. 99
S. Ct. at 898. Relying on New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), the Court deferred to
the Texas legislature, finding that the prohibition of optometric trade names was rationally
related to a legitimate state interest, and that the classification neither violated fundamental
rights nor drew a suspect classification. 99 S. Ct. at 898. Similarly, the senior citizens' argument that consumers had a due process right to share in Board membership was dismissed. Id.
at 898 n.19. The majority found that the legislative scheme, as enacted, was well within the
bounds of the "broad limits" with which the due process clause circumscribes state economic
regulation. Id. Furthermore, the Court found no proof in the record that the Board's primarily noncommercial makeup would create a significant likelihood of restrictions on optometric advertising which would infringe the senior citizens' first amendment right to receive
information. Id. at 899 n.20.
9. Bigelow v. Virinia, 421 U.S. 809, 820-21 (1975). It is important to distinguish purely
commercial speech from commercial speech in general. Both commercial speech and purely
commercial speech propose a commercial transaction. However, when matters of public
interest are presented in speech which proposes a commercial transaction, that phenomena is
described as only commercial speech, not purely commercial speech. Purely commercial speech
is commercial speech in its pristine form, devoid of any matters of public interest. Compare id.
(abortion advertisement) and New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (political advertisement) with Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973) (newspaper want-ads).
10. Four other categories of speech, according to the Court, are outside the range of first
amendment protection: 1) libel, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); 2) incitement to riot, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); 3) obscenity, Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957); and 4) fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 375 U.S. 568 (1942).
It has been pointed out that, except for commercial speech, all of the other exceptions to first
amendment protection are judged harmful in and of themselves. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 429, 431 (1971).
11. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Chrestensen owned a former U.S. Navy
submarine which he exhibited for profit. He brought the vessel to New York City and
attempted to advertise it by distributing handbills in the street. Upon doing so, he was
advised by Police Commissioner Valentine that his activity violated the Sanitary Code which
forbade the distribution of commercial literature in the streets. Valentine added that if the
handbill were devoted to information or a public protest, its distribution would be legal.
Chrestensen reprinted the handbill with the addition of a public protest concerning the
docking facilities in New York City on the back. Valentine restrained him from distributing
the second version of the handbill and Chrestensen filed stit in federal district court seeking
an injunction to prohibit enforcement of the ordinance. The district court granted the injunction and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld it.
Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941).
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the Supreme Court's classification of commercial speech turned upon the primary purpose of the speaker, 12 for if the speaker's motive was purely commerial,
no first amendment protection was accorded.' 3 In 1964, this concentration on
the purpose of the speaker was abandoned 4 in the landmark case of New York
Times, Inc. v. Sullivan.25 There, the Court shielded a political advertisement
from a libel suit upon first amendment grounds. 6 In so doing, the Court
adopted a content test to determine if speech appearing in commercal form
warranted first amendment protection.17 This new test protected only advertiseReversing the circuit court, the United States Supreme Court first reaffirmed its holding in
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), that the streets were the proper place for the exercise of
first amendment freedoms, and that these freedoms could not be subjected to undue burdens.
316 U.S. at 54. The Court then observed: "we are equally dear that the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." Id. The Court
concluded that the protest was merely added for the purpose of evading the ordinance and
that, if Chrestensen's action were permitted, "every merchant who desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude." Id. at
55.
12. See Redish, supranote 10, at 452. Professor Redish argues that focusing on the motivation or primary purpose of the speaker is nonsensical because the first amendment protects
the listener's right to receive information as well as the speaker's right to speak.' Further,
logical extension of the primary purpose test would warrant no first amendment protection
for the publishers of books and newspapers, since their primary purpose is profit. Id. For an
extended discussion of the primary purpose test, see the majority and dissenting opinions in
Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941).
13. The Court identified three primary purposes that are protected when found in a
commercial context. First, in a number of similar cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, the
Court ruled that local ordinances banning or taxing door-to-door salesman were not applicable to canvassers with a religious motive merely because -they solicited funds. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). Second,
solicitation of members for a labor union was held to be protected speech in Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). Third, in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the solicitation
of litigants to bring suit challenging racial segregation in the public schools was held to be
political expression and not exciuded from first amendment protection merely because it was
"solicitation." These cases should be contrasted with Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622 (1951), in which a door-to-door salesman of national magazines was convicted under a
local ordinance prohibiting such conduct. The Court found there was a commercial element
involved in selling magazines that was not present in the Jehovah's Witnesses' cases, and
therefore upheld the ordinance. See Redish, supra note 10, at 454. For a recent case upholding
a similar ordinance see Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 391 A.2d 1066 (Pa, 1978).
14. Although the primary purpose test was discarded, Chrestensen was not directly overruled. See note 17 infra. Chrestensen has nonetheless been sharply criticized by the Court.
Justice Douglas, concurring in Cammanaro v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), characterized
[i]t has not survived reflection." Id. at
the earlier decision as "casual, almost offhand ....
514. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976), the Ch'estensen approach was labeled "simplistic." id. at 759.
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. The libel suit was filed by the police commissioner of Mobile, Alabama against the
New York Times, for running an advertisement by the NAACP which criticized the treatment
of blacks in the South. The publishers were given full first amendment protection despite the
fact that their primary purpose in printing the advertisement was commercial. 376 U.S. at 266.
17. Although the advertisement in the New York Times was. commercial speech, the
Court held that because of differences in content it could not be equated with the handbill
examined in Chrestensen. 376 U.S. at 266. The distinction was that the New York Times
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ments with a content traditionally within the purview of the first amendment,
However, the Court's shift in focus from the purpose of the speaker to the content of the speech did not signal the advent of first amendment protection for
purely commercial speech. Rather, this content-oriented approach more2 0 narrowly defined' 9 what constituted unprotected purely commercial speech.
The Court further narrowed 2' the area of commercial speech remaining
outside the ambit of the first amendment in Bigelow v. Virginia.22 In applying
the content test to an advertisement banned under a state prohibition on
abortion advertising, the Court found that the statute violated a newspaper
editor's first amendment rights because the censured advertisement contained
information of interest and value to the public.23 As a result, not only political
with a high public interest content
advertisements but all commercial speech
24
was deemed safeguarded from regulation.
advertisement "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and
objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern." Id. In thus emphasizing
public interest content as the guideline for what is to be protected by the first amendment,
the Court adopted the views of Alexander Meiklejohn. Brennan, The Supreme Court and
the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965). Briefly,
the Meiklejohn theory asserts that the first amendment protects the public's right to selfgovernment by preserving the freedom of communication on public issues. Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 252-57.
18. The Court has traditionally interpreted the purpose of the first amendment as protection of political discussion. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
19. One of the principal problems in dealing with commercial speech is defining it. See
Note, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional
Doctrine,44 U. CHI. L. REv. 205, 225-36 (1976).
20. Knapp, Commercial Speech, the Federal Trade Commission and the First Amendment, 9 MEMPHIS ST. L. Rav. 1 (1978); Comment, Constitutional Law-Commercial Speech
Doctrine-A Clarification of the Protection Afforded Advertising Under the First Amendment
1975 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 797, 799.
21. The inclination of the Court to grant greater protection to commercial speech was
displayed prior to Bigelow in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). In that decision the Court refused to protect newspaper want-ads
because they were adjudged illegal as sex-discriminatory. Dictum in the case stressed that there
might be merit in the argument that purely commercial speech deserved greater first amendment protection than it had previously received. Id. at 388-89.
22. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
23. Id. at 822, 829. This controversy originated from the conviction of an editor of a
college newspaper for encouraging the procuring of abortions by publishing an advertisement
of a New York abortion clinic. While reversing his conviction, the Court ruled an overbreadth challenge to the statute was moot because the statute under which he was convicted
had since been amended. The Court viewed the information concerning the availability of
abortion services and residency requirements as matters of genuine interest. Id. at 822.
24. Comparing the advertisements considered in New York Times and Bigelow sheds
light on the issue. In New York Times the commercial format merely served as a vehicle for
public protest, while advertisement in Bigelow proposed a commercial transaction. Therefore,
the content approach extended first amendment protection to commercial speech which concerned a matter of public interest. Knapp, supra note 20, at 18. Cf. Nat'l Comm'n on Egg
Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977) (deceptive commercial advertisement with
public interest does not receive the same first amendment protection as the ad in New York
Times).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss4/6

4

Fleuchaus: First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: An Optical Illu
1979]

CASE COMMENTS

One year later, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council,25 the Court abandoned the content test. In Virginia
Pharmacy, a consumer group challenged a Virginia statute 6 prohibiting price
7
advertising by pharmacists. The Court held that purely commercial speech
29
28
deserved at least some first amendment protection regardless of its content
or the business motive behind it.30 Advertising, said the Court, even absent the
public interest element involved in Bigelow, 1 was "not valueless in the
marketplace of ideas." 32 This incorporation of purely commercial speech into a
first amendment marketplace theory 32 placed a high priority on open channels
of communication between sellers and consumers. 4 Accordingly, when the

25. 425 U.. 748 (1976).
26. Id. at 749-50 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §54-524.35(3) (1974)).
27. The Court deemed drug price advertising an example of purely commercial speech.

"Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or
The 'idea' he wishes to communicate is simply this: 'I will sell you X prepolitical ....
scription drug at the Y price."' 425 U.S. at 761. But see note 43 infra and accompanying text.
28. 425 U.S. at 761-62. A majority of commentators has been in favor of first amendment
protection for purely commercial speech. See Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 13 CALIF. W.L. Rav. 430 (1977); Redish, supra note 10; Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080; Note, Yes, FTC, There

is a Virginia: The Impact of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, on the Federal Trade Commission's Regulation of Misleading Advertising, 57
B.U.L. R . 833 (1977); Note, supra note 19. But see Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in
the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. Rav. 1 (1976); Jackson 8- Jeffries, Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. R v. 1 (1979).

29. 425 U.S. at 761-62. The Court pointed out that because the two features of commercial speech content, commercial subject matter and facts, receive full first amendment
protection when imparted to the public for some reason other than making a sale, the content
of purely commercial speech cannot be the reason it has not been protected. Id.
30. Id. at 763. Speech which was primarily economically motivated receives first amendment protection in some instances. To support this proposition the Court relied on NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), in which an employer was granted a limited first
amendment right to discuss his views on unionism with his employees. Only limited protection was accorded because of the economic relationship involved, which was thought to be
more coercive than the relationship between a political candidate and a voter. Id. at 617-18.
For a more theoretical justification for first amendment protection, see Redish, supra note 10.
31. 425 U.S. at 760, 765.
32. Id. at 764-65. The Court thought that maintaining the public interest requirement
was a meaningless gesture since an element of public interest could be easily added to
virtually any advertisement. Id. Professors Jackson and Jeffries contend that this argument is
unsupported on historical or practical grounds. Jackson &Jeffries, supra note 28, at 21-24.
33. The marketplace theory of the first amendment was enunciated in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting): "[T]he ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
." Id. at 630. See generally L. TRmnE,
itself accepted in the competition of the market ..
AMERICAN CoNs-rrrtrrIoNAL LAw 576-79 (1978). Although the Court never explicitly incorporated purely commercial speech into the first amendment by way of the marketplace theory,
its references to the marketplace and the free flow of information were numerous. 425 U.S. at
760, 763-65, 770. See Baker, supra note 28, at 3, 45-46; Note, supranote 28, at 845-46.
34. 425 U.S. at 770.
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Court balanced3- the state interest in high professional standards 36 against the
advertiser's first amendment right to speak,3 7 the consumer's first amendment
right to receive information s3 and society's interest in the free flow of information3 9 they found that the absolute ban on price advertising violated the first

35. Id. at 762-70. Implicit in a balancing approach to first amendment analysis is the
assumption that all speech, even that traditionally protected, is vulnerable to regulation by
the government. "Advertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest." Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
The requirement of only a "legitimate" public interest and not the "compelling" one traditionally necessary, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), justifies the fear that
balancing may become "a mechanism for rationalizing and validating the kinds of government action intended to be prohibited." Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71
YALE L.J. 1424, 1449 (1962). The principal critic of balancing on the Court was Justice Black.
See Konigsberg v. California, 366 U.S. 36, 61-75 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). For some
criticisms of balancing, see Baker, supra note 28, at 46; Knapp, supra note 20, at 15-16. But see
Gunther, In Search of JudicialQuality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1972) (balancing approach is more intellectually satisfying than
other approaches); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in
Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 825-26 (1962) (balancing does not allow judges to rest on their
predispositions).
36. 425 U.S. at 766-69. The State argued that price advertising would result in a mass
marketing approach to prescription drug sales, which would in turn cause pharmacists to
sacrifice expertise at the customer's expense or be forced out of business. Id. at 768. The
Court in earlier cases had recognized a valid state interest in preserving professionalism and
disallowed equal protection and due process challenges to price advertising by professionals.
See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (optomerical services); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (eyeglass frames); Semler v. Board of Dental
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (dental services).
37. 425 U.S. at 762-63.
38. Id. at 756-57. The right of a listener to receive information relating to political
matters was recognized in the case of Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-64 (1972). There
it was acknowledged by the Court that a first amendment right to receive information had
been specifically referred to in a variety of contexts. See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 408-09 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). The Court found the interest supporting the
consumer's right to receive information to be substantial in Virginia Pharmacy. "As to the
particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may
be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."
425 U.S. at 763. The consumer's specific interest in prescription drugs was emphasized by the
Court's conclusion that they were a basic necessity. Id. at 764.
39. 425 U.S. at 765. Society's interest in the free flow of information is based on a desire
for proper allocation of resources. To make this determination the Court relied on a freemarket economic theory. "So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions." Id. See also FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("Proper advertising serves a legitimate and important purpose in the
market by educating the consumer as to available alternatives."). In his Virginia Pharmacy
dissent, Justice Rehnquist caustically remarked that "there is certainly nothing in the . . .
Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to teachings of Adam Smith in
" 425 U.S. at 784. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
its legislative decisions ..
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics."). For further criticism see Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 28, at 16-18; The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 145 n.23 (1977).
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amendment.40

The VirginiaPharmacy holding created uncertainty on at least two points. 1
First, discarding the content approach seemed unnecessary, despite its drawbacks,42 since it was evident that the content of the challenged pharmaceutical

advertisements was of great importance to consumers. 43 Second, the Court
setup an ambiguous distinction when they ruled that commercial speech could
be regulated when it was false, misleading, or deceptive, 44 due to the "common-

sense" difference between advertising and traditionally protected expression. In
allowing regulation of advertising when there exists the possibility of harm to
consumers, the Court seemed to retain the public interest content test since that
approach was also based upon the value of a particular advertisement to the
public. Therefore, despite language suggesting that purely commercial speech

should be accorded some first amendment protection, it was difficult to determine the Court's position in Virginia Pharmacy with respect to the degree of
protection now afforded purely commercial speech, or the role that content
would play in determining the extent of that protection. 45 Subsequent decisions

40. 425 U.S. at 770.
41. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 39, at 149-51; Note, The Commercial
Speech Doctrine and the First Amendment, 12 TULSA L.J. 699, 706 (1977); Note, supra note
19, at 218-22; Comment, Constitutional Law: The Consumer's Right to Know -New First
Amendment Weapon in the War on Price-Advertising Bans, 29 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 354, 363-64

(1976).
42. 425 U.S. at 764-65. Principally the Court thought that advertisers could manipulate
their advertisements to achieve the appropriate content. See note 32 supra.
43. Id. at 763 8- n.18. "Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A disproportionate
amount of their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs; yet they are the least able
to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their scarce dollars are best
spent." Id. at 763.
44. Id. at 771 & n.24. The Court thought that purely commercial speech could be differentiated from traditionally protected speech in two important ways. First, commercial
speech is easily verifiable, being based on objective facts. Second, commercial speech is
durable, because of its relation to profit. These two characteristics allow for restrictions on
deceptive speech without any danger of chilling truthful commercial speech. Id. See Knapp,
supra note 20, at 25-27; Developments in the Law- Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1005, 1031 (1967). For some of the problems of this approach see The Supreme Court, 1975
Term, supra note 39, at 150-51. The Court's attitude seemed contradictory to language earlier
in the opinion. See note 95 infra; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 39, at 145.

45. One commentator concluded that Virginia Pharmacy is only precedent for two
propositions. "First, the mere recital of the words 'commercial speech' by a state no longer
provides an independent basis for decision. It is clear that a court's analysis must focus on
other factors. Second, because of the nature of our economy, some commercial speech is
entitled to first amendment protection because it is necessary for informed consumer decision making." Note, supra note 41, at 706-07. The lower courts have focused on two themes
from Virginia Pharmacy. See Methpah, Inc. v. Imperato, 450 F. Supp. 115, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
("The task for the Court is to assess the public first amendment interest in the free flow of the
information ..
"); Warner-Lambert Co. v. 'FTC,562 F.2d 749, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("A
careful reading of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council
... [shows] ...

that the first amendraent presents 'no obstacle' to government regulation of

false or misleading advertising."),
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only slightly clarified the uncertainty surrounding the degree of protection
46
afforded commercial speech.
In Ohralik v. State Bar Association, the Court upheld a statutory prohibition on in-person solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain.47 That opinion
attempted to further delineate the degree of first amendment protection which
commercial speech was to receive. Commercial speech, the Court declared,
would receive a "limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of first amendment values." 48 This position constituted a retreat from the expansive language of Virginia Pharmacy49 because
commercial expression was placed on the lower level of a two-tiered theory of
free speech. However, the distinction between the commercial speech tier and
the noncommercial speech tier was only set by an enigmatic reference to the
"commonsense difference" mentioned in Virginia Pharmacy, thus providing
little guidance for determining the degree of constitutional protection accorded
commercial speech.50
The instant case marked the first time that the Court was asked to protect
commercial speech differing significantly from the informational advertising in
VirginiaPharmacy.51 Comparing the trade names found in the instant case with
the prescription drug advertising protected in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
46. The Court cautiously extended first amendment protection to advertising of routine
attorney services in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates adds little to
Virginia Pharmacy and was most aptly described by one commentator as a "giant step sideways for the commercial speech doctrine." Note, supra note 41, at 730. Most notable about
Bates were the two further restrictions placed on first amendment protection for purely commercial speech. First, the Court ruled that the first amendment overbreadth doctrine did not
apply in the commercial speech area. 433 U.S. at 380-81. See Comment, Commercial Speech:
Foreclosing on the Overbreadth Doctrine, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 479 (1978). Second, the Court
indicated that advertisements concerning quality of services are probably unprotected. 433
U.S. at 384-85. In Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), the
Court overturned a local ordinance designed to prevent white flight to the suburbs, by
banning the use of "For Sale" signs by homeowners. The Court ruled that the ordinance
violated the first amendment as an impermissible regulation on the content of commercial
speech. However, in an approach similar to that taken in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
emphasized the strong public interest involved in the case. Id. at 96. Linmark should be
compared with Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), in which the Court
held that a city could permissibly regulate where adult films could be shown. The plurality
opinion stated that "the content of a particular advertisement may determine the extent of
its [first amendment] protection." Id. at 68. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 US.
678 (1977) (prohibition on advertisements of contraceptives overturned).
47. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
48. Id. at 455. This lower degree of first amendment protection allotted to purely commercial speech, according to the Court, allows an amount of state regulation that would be
impermissible in more traditional first amendment areas. Id. at 456. Perhaps ironically, the
same case that was cited as precedent for extending first amendment protection to purely
commercial speech, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), was cited in support of
this proposition as well. 436 U.S. at 456.
49. See note 95 infra.
50. 436 U.S. at 455-56. Cf. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (Mr. Justice Stewart's method for evaluating obscenity was: "I know it when
I see it.").
51. 99 S. Ct. at 895.
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commented that although both were examples of purely commercial speech,
price advertising was self-contained and self-explanatory whereas a trade name
had no intrinsic meaning.52 This was because trade names only supplied information after a person has had time to associate the name with some standard
of price and quality. Therefore, the Court concluded that there existed a
"significant possibility" that trade names could be employed to mislead the
public.5
In previous decisions the Court had expressed concern regarding first
amendment protection for misleading or deceptive advertising. 4 The instant
Court's response to this problem was to continue to accord purely commercial
speech the lower degree of protection applied in Ohralik.5s This lower degree
of protection would allow state regulation of purely commercial speech in

order to "insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired."' 6 Since Texas' restriction of optometrical trade names was
supported by direct evidence of past deceptions in that field, the Court found
section 5.13(d) of the Texas Optometry Act permissible. 57 However, the Court
52. Id.
53. Id. The deceptiveness of a given trade name has been a much litigated issue, but
prior cases involved the permissibility of destruction by a state government of a valuable
property interest, not first amendment issues. The general approach of the Court has been
that since trade names can be valuable business assets, an individual trade name found to be
deceptive cannot be banned "if less drastic means will accomplish the same result." FTC v.
Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1946); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-13
(1933). Recently, following the decision in Virginia Pharmacy, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit endorsed this formula. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611
(3rd Cir. 1976). That court held that the elimination of the commercial speech exception in
the first amendment in Virginia Pharmacy meant that "the remedy for the perceived violation
can go no further in imposing a prior restraint on protected commercial speech than is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the remedial objective of preventing the violation." Id.
at 619. The validity of this holding is doubtful following the instant case. In a footnote, the
Court stated that the restriction on government power brought about by the property value
of a trade name is nonexistent when first amendment rights are being considered. Id. "[A]
property interest in a means of communication does not enlarge or diminish the First Amendment protection of that communication." 99 S. Ct. at 895 n.11. Therefore, the first amendment
does not require that the least restrictive remedy be used against deceptive trade names, notwithstanding the fact that the fifth amendment, if raised, might have imposed such a requirement.
54. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. at 383 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24, 775-81 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
55. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
56. 99 S.Ct. at 894 (citing Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24).
57. Id. at 895-96. The Court also cited an earlier Texas case, involving a challenge on
equal protection and due process grounds to the predecessor of section 5.13(d), in which
actual instances of the deceptive use of trade names were found. Id. at 896 (citing Texas
State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 412 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.) appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 52 (1967)). The court in Carp found that Dr. Rogers, a plaintiff in that
suit as well, had used the trade name Texas State Optical to give the misleading impression
that he or one of his brothers was present at the particular office. Further, plaintiff Carp was
found to have used trade names to mislead the public into believing that there was competition between businesses all owned by him. 99 S.Ct. at 896. In contrast, the brief for the
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indicated that an actual finding of deception was unnecessary to restrict a
particular form of commercial speech; rather, the only requirement was that
the kind of commercial speech in question "enhance the opportunity for misleading practices."' 's Trade names were deemed to present this problem because
they facilitated large-scale commercial enterprises. This development was
viewed as increasing the possibility of misleading practices, and as one that
states might legitimately wish to discourage.59 Therefore, the Court maintained
that validation of the Texas statute was necessary for the protection of consumers. Additionally, they found no detriment to the consumer as information
about optometrical prices and services could still be communicated through
direct informational advertising rather than by "ambiguous associations with
a trade name."6 10
Although Virginia Pharmacy laid the groundwork for an expansion of first
amendment protection for commercial speech, the instant case indicated that
no such expansion would occur. The Court appeared to follow the reasoning of
earlier cases by acknowledging that some first amendment protection was
available for purely commercial speech. However, rather than concentrating on
appellee argued that commercial optometrists had the lowest prices in the state and that it was
actually the professional optometrists who were trying to stifle competition. Brief for
Appellee at 6, 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979).
58. 99 S. Ct. at 897. This is an extremely broad standard to be employed in a first
amendment area. Several commentators had anticipated that after Virginia Pharmacy the
FTC would have to recognize the first amendment rights of advertisers and thus produce
closely drawn standards which protected that right. See Note, supra note 28, at 850, which
proposed the standard of "advertising that a reasonable person could interpret as making a
false assertion." Id. See also Knapp, supra note 20, at 30-32. There was an indication in
Linmark that the Court would devise a fairly stringent standard. "After Virginia Pharmacy
it is clear that commercial speech cannot be banned because of an unsubstantiated belief
that its impact is detrimental." Linmark Assoc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 n.6 (1977). See
also Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 396 A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1979).
The standard prescribed by the instant case, however, virtually ignores any right of the
speaker and gives the government an unchecked hand to deal with deceptive commercial
speech. See text accompanying notes 63-67 infra. This relaxed standard may greatly aid the
FTC in their attempt to regulate children's advertising. See generally Note, FTC Regulation
of TV Advertising to Children- They Deserve a Break Today, 30 U. FiA. L. Rav. 946 (1978).
59. 99 S. Ct. at 896. See Baker, supra note 28, at 48. Cf. 425 U.S. at 787-89 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[There] appears to have been a considered legislative judgment in most States
that while prescription drugs are a necessary and vital part of medical care and treatment,
there are sufficient dangers attending their widespread use that they simply may not be
promoted in the same manner as hair creams, deodorants, and toothpastes.")
60. 99 S. Ct. at 897. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall in dissent, argued that
the majority had overestimated the negative aspects of optometrical trade names while at the
same time ignoring their potential value to the consumer. Trade names, according to the
dissent, provide a valuable service to the mobile consumer by enabling quick and efficient
location of the goods and services needed. 99 S. Ct. at 900-01. For the validity of this supposition the dissenters relied on the deposition of Kenneth Benham, a professor and economist. Id.
It should be pointed out, however, that there is a split of opinion in the field of economics as
to whether trade names actually aid the consumer as Benham argues, or whether brand names
entrench consumers in irrational loyalties, thus actually lowering the competition in the
marketplace. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 72, 205 n.53. Further, the
dissent suggested the majority had done a disservice to consumers by upholding a statute that
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the right of the speaker, the Court focused on the interest of the consumer and
evinced a desire to protect only commercial speech which had value to the
consuming public.61 The Court's emphasis implies that first amendment protection for purely commercial speech may be illusory, and that Virginia
Pharmacy will be limited to its facts. 62
Analysis of the current treatment of deceptive commercial speech illustrates
the instant Court's preoccupation with the listener's, or consumer's, well-being.
Deceptive commercial speech is unprotected because it injures the consumer,
regardless of any rights which advertisers may have.63 Undeniably most noncommercial speech deemed unworthy of first amendment protection involves
injury to the listener, or to society at large. 64 Yet even in those instances, first
amendment protection is denied only after an exhaustive determination by the
Court that the speech in question poses an actual danger to society and is
valueless to the listener.65 This meticulous approach is ostensively employed to
avoid infringing upon citizens' first amendment right to speak. However, the
judicial scrutiny normally applied in free speech cases was not followed in the
instant case.
Although the Court was confronted with actual examples of deceptive
optometrical trade names, it indicated that such substantial proof was unnecessary and that a finding of deception could be predicated upon what appears to be little more than speculation. For the Court, a particular form of
commercial speech need only "enhance the opportunity for misleading practices" in order to be curtailed or prohibited.6 Arguably, this test ignores any
first amendment right existing in the speaker and exclusively protects the

effectively removed the existence of organized commercial optometry from the eye of the
consumer. 99 S. Ct. at 903.
61. 99 S. Ct. at 897. Of course, the Virginia Pharmacy Court focused to a great extent on
the consumer as well. "Mhe one facet of commercial price and product advertising that
warrants first amendment protections [is] its contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable
information relevant to public and private decisionmaking." 425 U.S. at 781 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). See note 43 supra. However, the instant decision demonstrated that when the
consumer's and the advertiser's interests are at odds the consumer's interest is stronger.
62. See note 45 supra. Perhaps all the commercial speech decisions have accomplished is
the prevention of automatic dismissals of first amendment claims in commercial advertising
cases.
63. Note, supra note 41, at 705.
64. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957); Chaplinsly v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
65. For instance, defamation is not protected by the first amendment. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). However, to protect the first amendment rights of the press,
the Court requires a public official, whose actions have been misrepresented, to establish
"actual malice" before a newspaper can be held liable for defamation. New York Times, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 256, 280-81 (1964).
66. 99 S. Ct. at 897. This test should be compared to the test enunciated in Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) to determine if a person could be convicted for advocating
violence. There, the Court held that the government could not forbid or proscribe advocacy
of violence "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447. Any statute which is not this narrowly
drawn, according to the Court, intrudes on first amendment freedoms. Id. at 448.
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listener.67 The degree of first amendment protection accorded commercial
speech under such an approach thus depends upon the consumer's interest.
In Virginia Pharmacy the Court had attempted to free evaluations of commercial speech from dependence on public interest content, but the content
value of the advertising to consumers nevertheless remained the controlling
consideration in that case 6s and the instant case. Because the consumers of
pharmaceuticals have a strong interest in obtaining price information, this
interest overrode the statutory prohibition. Correspondingly, in the instant
case, when the deceptive content of the commercial speech was found to negate
any consumer interest, the state's action was validated. Despite the internal
inconsistencies of these cases, the instant Court continued to embrace the idea
that commercial speech, like any other kind of expression, could not be regulated by content.6 9 The Court brushed aside any argument to the contrary by
reasoning that prohibiting the use of trade names would only "incidentalpy]"
70
affect the content of optometrical advertising.
The instant Court did concede that the extension of first amendment protection to commercial speech had created problems which remained unresolved.7 1 Of principal concern to the Court was the relevance of other free
speech cases to purely commercial speech.72 By regulating purely commercial
speech to a lower level of protection, the Court attempted to clarify some of
these difficulties. However, the uncertainty in the application of this two-tier
theory of the first amendment will remain until a precise distinction is drawn
between purely commercial speech and traditionally protected speech. Although this difference was described as "categorical" 73 and several distinguishing characteristics of pure commercial speech such as durability and verifiability,74 were indicated, the Court, unfortunately, has not progressed significantly

67. That the Court's primary intention in granting protection to purely commercial
speech was to safeguard the listener is shown by the interpretation of Virginia Pharmacy in
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). "A commercial advertisement is
constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller's business as because
it furthers the societal interest in the 'free flow of commercial information'." Id. at 783.
68. See note 43 supra. "The Court's discussions of the free enterprise system and of the
adverse impact on 'the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged' suggest what is all too apparent. The parties and the cause affected the outcome of the case." Jackson & Jeffries, supra
note 28, at 40.
69. 99 S.Ct. at 894. This approach should be compared with the evaluation of the commercial speech cases in Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). "The measure
of constitutional protection to be afforded commercial speech will surely be governed largely
by the content of the communication." Id. at 68-69.
70. 99 S. Ct. at 897. The effect may be more than incidental. As a result of the instant
decision, the only choice open to optometrists, if they wish to receive first amendment protection, is to conform to the narrow set of facts in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates. Such conformity requires that commercial speech by optometrists contain only informational advertising concerning prices and services for each place of business without the benefit of
advertising for a chain of businesses all known by the same name.
71. 99 S.Ct. at 894 n.9.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 895 n.l0.
74. See note 44 supra.
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beyond the simplistic labeling of that difference as a "commonsense" one.
While the theoretical ramifications behind this "commonsense" difference are
beyond the scope of this comment,7 5 an examination of the commercial speech
area in terms of the actual interest protected, that of the consumer, reveals that
the instant Court's recognition of lesser protection for purely commercial
speech fails to solve any of the problems in this area. This decision merely
minimized these problems by limiting the kinds of advertising to which first
amendment protection will extend.
The obscurity remains because purely commercial speech is not totally consistent with first amendment marketplace theory.7 6 This concept of free speech
emphasizes that an individual's right of expression should never be qualified,
since the ultimate value of an idea can only be tested in a marketplace of
competing ideas." Therefore, adherents of the theory argue that the government cannot restrict the entry of pure speech into the intellectual marketplace
on the basis of content.73 However, use of the marketplace theory in commercial
speech cases confuses the issue because in the realm of commercial speech, the
focus is on the interest of the listener rather than that of the speaker, and a

content-oriented evaluation is traditionally applied. These are differences not
simply of degree, but of kind,79 and the Court's application of a diluted

75. One commentator has argued that the "intuitive" difference between commercial
speech and traditionally protected speech justifies the exclusion of pure commercial speech
from first amendment protection. Baker, supra note 28, at 9-25. Professor Baker's argument is
based on the supposition that the first amendment is designed to safeguard the liberty of the
speaker. The function of the first amendment, according to Baker, is to promote the selfrealization of speakers. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877 (1963). However, since commercial speech is inextricably tied to the profit
motive and not to any individual values, it does not further the self-realization process.
Baker, supra note 28, at 25. The profit motive, Baker finds, seeks its own values which are
antagonistic to those the first amendment protects. "How 'profit' wants the world to be bears
no necessary xelation to how any individual wants it to be. To allow 'profit' to vote is to
depreciate human freedom." Id. at 16. Therefore, in order to give greater protection to individual rights over economic or property rights, commercial speech must be distinguished
from traditional speech by its purpose or source, namely the profit motive, and classified as an
abridgeable property right. Id. at 56.
76. See note 33 supra. However, one commentator argued that the Court expanded
Alexander Meiklejohn's concept of what should be protected by the first amendment, discussed
in note 17 supra, to include purely commercial speech. Schiro, Commercial Speech: The
Demise of a Chimera, 1976 Sup. Cr. REv. 45, 92-93. This difference of opinion may be more
apparent than real, though, because the marketplace and Meiklejohn theories of the first
amendment are closely related. L. TamE, supra note 33, at 577.
77. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CoNsTUrrTONAL LAw 718 (1978). The presence
of this concept in the Court's commercial speech analysis is exhibited by the following statement in Virginia Pharmacy: "[An] alternative to this highly paternalistic approach . . .is to
assume .. .that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than to close them." 425 U.S. at 770.
78. For examples of the Court's restraint on government power to restrict the content of
speech, see Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (government cannot regulate
picketing according to its subject matter); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (language
cannot be banned merely because it is offensive). See L. TRIE, supra note 33, at 581.
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marketplace theory to purely commercial speech only obfuscates the real basis
of its decisions.
Given the Court's admission of a "commonsense" difference between noncommercial and commercial speech and the conceptual confusion raised
thereby, its motive for extension of first amendment protection to advertising
merits investigation. One possible inducement might have been the desire to
correct a perceived anomaly in the law8 ° wherein a form of speech, advertising,
was unprotected by the first amendment. More likely, however, is that the
Court expanded the protection of commercial speech in order to protect consumers from irrational legislation which ignored their interests.8 ' If so, the
first amendment was an available vehicle for accomplishing this objective.
Following the substantive due process debacle of the 1930's,82 the Court has
barred itself from reviewing the policies underlying economic legislation except when the statutory scheme abridged constitutional rights or violated the
equal protection clause.8 3 Therefore, because consumers are not a suspect class
under equal protection analysis,8 4 it was necessary to expand the free speech
clause of the first amendment to include purely commercial speech in order to
overturn legislative decisions without resurrecting substantive due process.8 5
Since under this analysis the Court has used the first amendment in advertising cases as little more than a pretext for evaluating legislative economic determinations, the key to understanding the commercial speech cases will not be
found by examining traditional first amendment values. Rather, it may be uncovered by scrutinizing the factors on which the Court has focused in those
cases: the commercial needs of consumers, 6 the public interest value of the
speech,8 7 and the reasons behind the legislative action.88 Because consumer's
desires for informational resources do not theoretically conflict with the state's
wish to protect the public from misleading advertising, the determinative
factor in a decision on a challenged statute will be the public interest value of
79. Baker, supra note 28, at 56; and Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 28, at 25, also conclude
that the protection of purely commercial speech is inconsistent with traditional first amendment values.
80. See note 14 supra.
81. "The purpose of this holding [Virginia Pharmacy] is not merely to tidy-up the interpretation of the first amendment; rather it is to encourage more rational majority decisionmaking and a more open weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of policy alternatives
by preventing the use of the 'commercial speech' concept to deny entirely first amendment
protection to an important area of speech." Nowak, supra note 76, at 778. Rotunda, The
Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080, 1101.
82. See L. TI.BE, supra note 33, at 427-55; McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Cr. Rv. 34.
83. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
84. See J. NOWAK, supra note 77, at 524-25; L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 1012.
85. Professors Jackson and Jeffries find this development to be startling. "One might
have thought, as the Court has so often proclaimed, that demanding judicial review of
economic legislation was a thing of the past ... [yet] ... economic due process is resurrected,
clothed in the ill-fitting garb of the first amendment, and sent forth to battle the kind of
special interest legislation that the Court has tolerated for more than forty years." Jackson &
Jeffries, supra note 28, at 30.
86. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
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the information prohibited. In only one situation, when a statute has withheld
information of great interest to consumers, has the Court struck down state
action.8 9 On the other hand, when the value of the prohibited information to
the public is questionable, as in the instant case, the Court has been willing to
defer to the legislature's judgment.0 Therefore, Virginia Pharmacy, which
struck down a paternalistic withholding of vital information, continues to
delineate the outer limits of first amendment protection for purely commercial
speech.- This case will probably be cited to support future limitations of first
amendment protection for purely commercial speech, as it was in the instant
case, rather than to provide a starting point for future expansion.92 The Court's
new emphasis on the lower degree of protection for purely commercial speech
will probably ensure this result.
By the instant case the Court has solidified the division of the first amendment into two-tiers which, similar to equal protection theory, receive different
degrees of protection. 93 The primary danger presented by this approach is that
it invites a gradual leveling of the two tiers and a consequent erosion of the
protection accorded speech traditionally subject to higher judicial scrutiny.
Although the two-tier theory of the first amendment was articulated in order
to avoid such a result,94 and while it may improve on the vaguer standard95
87. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.

88. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
89. Cases falling in this category are: Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 43 U.S. 350 (1977);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assoc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85 (1977); Virginia State Rd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.

478 (1976).
90. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), falls into this general category
even though the rule challenged was an ethics provision. See text accompanying note 47 supra.

Perhaps the deference exhibited by the instant Court foreshadows a conscious desire to avoid
examining legislative economic decisions. "Because of the special character of commercial
speech and the relative novelty of first amendment protection for such speech we act with
caution in confronting first amendment challenges to economic legislation that serves legitimate regulatory interests." 99 S. Ct. at 894 n.9.
91. Professor Tribe has argued that Linmark is an extension of the Virginia Pharmacy
rationale because the case involved victims who were "less sympathetic" and policy objectives
which were "more compelling." L. Tam,, supra note 77, at 653. However, Linmark involved
one factor not present in Virginia Pharmacy; the challenged ordinance not only affected
businesses, but private homeowners as well. For this reason the precedential value of Linmark
is doubtful.
92. It is important to remember how narrow the facts were in Virginia Pharmacy. It
involved a blanket suppression of truthful price advertising of a standardized product which
was of great value to consumers.
93. For an examination of two-tiered equal protection analysis see San Antonio Ind.
School Dist, v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7-0 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
95. The standard enunciated in Virginia Pharmacy is vague because it blends the value of
purely commercial speech with traditionally protected speech. "Therefore, even if the first
amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking
in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal."
425 U.S. at 765. "As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of information, that
interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
- 1
political debate." Id. at 768.
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